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ABSTRACT  
 
Markets show well known difficulties in delivering the right signals of looming imbalances, may 
underreact or overreact to them and cannot properly correct them. Pure monetary unions add no 
significant system of signaling and re-adjustment and can even cause further imbalances. The 
more so if the asymmetries producing such imbalances have a structural nature, as in this case 
some markets, such as labour markets, may not work in an appropriate way. In this situation 
moral hazard and adverse selection can easily arise, making correction of imbalances more 
difficult. The system should then be helped to deliver proper signals and to correct them. The 
OCA theory must be made to work and appropriate non-market institutions, mainly at the union 
level, should be created. In particular, a common financial regulation, fiscal, industrial and labour 
policies should be introduced, while devising consistent institutions at the country level. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Expectations from the EMU were high and appeared to be realized to a 
large extent up to 2008, but then the Union precipitated into a deep crisis. 
Before the EMU, existence of asymmetries and imbalances within the 
Union was recognized, but they were thought to be irrelevant, as the EMU 
institutions – in essence, the common currency and free movements of 
factors and goods – were able to eliminate them. Proper signals would 
give an incentive to private and public decision-makers in order to cope 
with them. The transformation of the financial crisis in private markets into 
a sovereign debtor crisis and its prolongation beyond the time it lasted in 
the United States needs an explanation. The explanation must take 
account of the specificities of the EMU as a(n imperfect) currency union, 
very different from the United States. The suspect is that the roots of this 
crisis were in the previous performance of the Union. Going even more 
back, the institutional architecture and policies of the Union should have 
been lacking (Acocella 2014a, b) and forecasts of their ability to cope with 
the different structural conditions of the participating countries and the 
existing asymmetries and imbalances should have been ‘greatly 
exaggerated’. 
In this paper we want to study some specific aspects of the following 
issues: 1. The influence of external constraints and contractionary 
monetary and fiscal policies on the adoption of suitable reforms in higher-
inflation countries. 2. The possibility that the late manifestation of crisis 
can be due to signals coming out of market trends, which are noisy, for a 
number of reasons. 3. Whether wrong signals might have induced moral 
hazard and adverse selection of public and private decision-makers. 
Many contributions have been published on these topics, but most of 
them need further discussion, especially with regard to one in relations to 
other. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section deals with the 
imbalances in the Union, both those pre-existing to its creation and those 
that loomed later; it compares expectations as to their permanence to 
realizations, ending with the private and public debt crisis in more recent 
years. Section 3, instead, deals with the effects of the monetary and fiscal 
discipline imposed by European institutions and policies. The object of 
section 4 are the incentives arising before and after the institution of the 
EMU, due to the change in the perspectives, the incoming budget 
constraint and the different signals. Section 5 discusses the issue of the 
link between signals, moral hazard and adverse selection of politicians. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
  
2. IMBALANCES IN THE EMU  
 
2.1. Expectations from the Union  
 
Expectations for the possible accomplishments of the European 
Monetary Union were high (e.g., Commission of the European 
Communities, 1990, 1991). Only a few critiques were raised against the 
project of a monetary union that was deprived of some essential pre-
conditions for its proper functioning and aimed almost exclusively at 
achieving monetary stability while not being complemented by other 
institutional pillars tending to cope with imbalances and stimulate growth 
in an uneven environment . 
From the point of view of each participating country, loss of one 
instrument (monetary policy) in favor of a centralized authority might not 
imply a parallel loss in the ability to control the economy, as entering the 
monetary union would also imply a parallel drop in one target, that of the 
balance of payments equilibrium.  Some authors had drastically claimed 
that the effects of ‘asymmetrical shocks would be eliminated under a 
monetary union with perfect capital mobility and currency substitution’ 
(Weber, 1991: 204), even if, according to a few others (see the previous 
footnote), this was more problematic. 
From the point of view of the Union as an integrating area, there were 
imbalances among the different countries. These were due to inertial, 
behavioral and structural factors in some countries (which stemmed, on 
the one hand, from diffuse inefficiencies and, on the other, the Balassa-
Samuelson effect), showing themselves in their public accounts as well as 
in other features of their economies, such as higher-inflation rates. These 
imbalances had been reduced, but not eliminated, in the transition to the 
EMU (Allsopp, Vines, 1998) and also afterwards (Lane, 2006). Persisting 
this tendency, together with, possibly, the artificially high level of domestic 
demand deriving from high public spending, the current account of the 
balance of payments would tend to be negative. However, this would not 
have raised any concern for two reasons. First, because any imbalances 
in the current account would be cleared by free movements of capital 
(Blanchard, Giavazzi, 2002, who conclude that, ‘although benign neglect 
may not be optimal, it appears to be a reasonable course of action.’). 
Second, in the process, the common currency as well as integration of 
markets and limits to public deficits and debts would induce policymakers 
and other agents to change their conduct and introduce needed reforms, 
with the result of eliminating public accounts imbalances, reducing public 
debt, rising competitiveness, reducing risk prospects (see, e.g., 
Commission of the European Communities, 1990, 1991; Jahjah, 2000; 
Papademos, 2001 and other references in Fernandez-Villaverde et al, 
2013, henceforth, FV), not only in higher-inflation countries, but also in 
  
other countries such as France, which suffered from some other kind of 
imbalances.  
This change in the conduct of public and private agents in higher-
inflation countries was at least an implicit assumption behind the 
institutional design of the EMU. More in detail, a beneficial impulse for re-
balancing would derive from:  
- the impossibility for governments to maintain unemployment any 
longer below its natural rate by expansionary demand policies; this would 
be the effect of the SGP and a conservative central bank, which would 
force governments to change their conduct; reduced public imbalances 
would contribute to lower demand and to curb excess inflation, with 
positive effects on current account imbalances; 
- the impossibility of private decision-makers to rely on competitive 
exchange-rate devaluations as a kind of soft budget constraint, i.e. in 
order to regain the competitiveness lost due to inefficiencies, rent-seeking 
and wrong conduct: workers, unions and firms in higher-inflation countries 
could no longer earn ‘monopoly’ rents, would thus change their conduct in 
order to bring back inflation in those countries in line with that of more 
stable countries, with beneficial current account imbalances;  
- the wider context and opportunities for comparisons and choice 
(especially for asset returns, once these were cleared of the currency risk 
component), which would induce public and private agents to adopt more 
cautionary policies; higher transparency and possibility to compare prices 
across EMU countries would also imply that even in non-tradable sectors 
beneficial changes in the conduct of agents could come from a higher 
pressure from consumers and the government or competition from foreign 
direct investment (Commission of the European Communities, 1990, 
1991; Dyson, Featherstone, 1996). 
 
2.2. Realizations 
 
The expectations appeared to be confirmed before the crisis burst. In 
2007 the average unemployment rate in the EMU-17 had dropped to 7.5 
% , starting from levels higher than 9 % at the beginning of the decade, 
with a very low dispersion.  Poverty rates had fallen to their bottom in 
2009 and families at risk of poverty or social exclusion were 21.3 % of the 
total. 
Nevertheless, optimism was out of place. In fact, the initial favourable 
expectations mentioned in the previous section contained a contradiction. 
After entering the EMU, governments were certainly relieved of the 
balance of payments constraint/target, but, pending structural imbalances 
and current account deficits, this could only happen if there were lasting 
capital inflows. However, reduction in domestic interest rates due to 
elimination of the country risk and capital inflows, even if beneficial for the 
  
governments and private agents, could have softened their budget 
constraint.  
This contradiction materialized for the worse under the effects of the 
financial crisis started in 2007-2008.  
Unemployment rates soared, respectively to 12.0 % in 2013 and 
showed a much higher dispersion, while people at risk of poverty in 2012 
had increased by 2 p.p..  Imbalances in the current account and 
government budget as well as other structural imbalances causing them 
had lasted un-tackled for too long, were compensated by capital inflows 
into the peripheral countries for too long and finally transformed into a 
sovereign debt problem (Acocella, 2014a). The signals were perceived 
only by a limited number of people (see FV) and were evident only rather 
late, as a consequence of the burst of the bubble itself and, to some 
extent, also from the emergence of new theoretical insights (Acocella, 
2014b).  
More specifically, real interest rate changes and expected future rates 
acted on international transactions quicker than changes in goods prices. 
As said, the latter tended to rise more in some countries for structural 
reasons. With practically equalized nominal interest rates across the EMU, 
due to the common currency, high-inflation countries had an incentive to 
borrow and direct funds to speculative operations in the real estate and 
stock markets (De Grauwe, 2010a), while low-inflation countries had an 
incentive to lend abroad. Thus, capital inflows and external financing of 
banks made construction booms possible, led to soaring financial asset 
prices and easy lending to the public sector (Lane, McQuade, 2013). The 
effects of a deteriorating current account induced by structural imbalances 
were slower to act, as usual (EEAG, 2011).  
The implication (again EEAG, 2011: ch. 2) was that the policymakers in 
high-inflation countries indulged in the illusion that everything went for the 
best and didn’t make their home-works, i.e. they did not reduce public 
deficits and debts and appropriately supervise and regulate financial 
intermediaries; nor did they implement structural changes in order to make 
their economies to become more competitive.  On the other hand, also 
private agents could finance their consumption or investment activity more 
easily, in particular in speculative activities. Even when they finally 
realized they had arrived at the edge of the precipice, both policymakers 
and private agents (in particular, banks) didn’t care and in some cases 
relied on other countries’ bailout (moral hazard). This is certainly a part of 
the explanation. More precisely, it is true that there was an ‘illusion’ of the 
soundness of the situation. But ‘illusion’ is an elusive term. We will explore 
if there was more than that.  
According to some authors (e.g., FV), capital inflows propelled into 
higher-inflation countries caused high rates of growth, which have raised 
incentive problems, as they softened or cancelled the necessary reactions 
and favored adverse selection of politicians and other decision-makers. 
  
Thus, the high real growth, according to FV, made the signals coming out 
of imbalances noisy, not only for policymakers but also for ordinary 
citizens. In the same directions acted expectations of high real growth, 
which convinced people of the sustainability of debt (EEAG, 2011). This 
argument will be dealt with more extensively later, in section 4. In the next 
section we explore the effects on reforms for efficiency and equity, first, of 
introducing the new common institutions devised for the EMU and, in 
addition, of adopting tight monetary and fiscal policies, without reference 
to the existence of proper signals of imbalances. 
 
 
3. THE EFFECTS OF THE EMU INSTITUTIONS AND MONETARY AND FISCAL 
DISCIPLINE.  
 
3.1. The EMU as an external tie  
 
Three issues arise both in retrospect and in prospect with reference to 
the EMU crisis: 
1. What reforms were and are necessary in a currency union such as 
the EMU; 
2. Were these reforms possible within the rules adopted by the Union 
and suggested in the literature?  
3. Were the role of the EMU institutions and that of the national 
governments and agents enough clear? 
Milone (2014) largely covers the first issue, mainly by reviewing a large 
literature, which often comes from public organizations such as the IMF 
and OECD. Milone refers specifically to reforms that appear necessary 
after the crisis, but these are largely the same as those needed before it. 
Necessary reforms differ among the various countries, but should aim at 
increasing both static and dynamic efficiency, reducing excessive income 
inequality and reforming political institutions. Monastiriotis, Zartaloudis 
(2010) deals only with those referred to labour markets, in particular with 
flexibility and argues that theoretical and empirical considerations show 
the existence of a variety of degrees and directions for the (de)regulation 
of labour markets and the agenda is open for an active exploration of the 
most appropriate policy options. These should have been discussed and 
disciplined even before the crisis, which has simply accentuated the 
underlying issues, having to do with the essential features of the 
‘European model’ (rules versus discretion, the role of free markets, of 
fiscal policy, the relative weights of price stability and employment in the 
welfare function of the policymakers).   
The variety of policies needed to address inefficiencies and inequality is 
important, because it is apparently consistent with the existence of 
different institutions at the various levels of the EMU governance and also 
impinges on the latter two issues listed at the beginning of the section, 
which are the focus of our analysis.  
  
Notwithstanding the variety of institutions, both the founding fathers of 
the Union and the literature before the creation of the EMU practically 
delegated most of  the burden for integration, alignment, reforms, etc. to 
the institutions at the Union’s levels in a wide sense. The most important 
common institution is obviously the common currency, but much trust was 
put in markets too, in a practical vacuum of other common institutions and 
with specific limitations to national action in the fiscal field, through the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Many economists and politicians saw 
this institutional architecture as imposing a strong network of ties on the 
conduct of the agents, both public and private, in the countries with higher 
inefficiencies. These ties should – almost naturally – compel them to 
change their conduct and enact the needed reforms. 
A number of theoretical considerations and catchphrases were 
advanced to explain the virtues of these external ties and their capability 
to foster the necessary changes of conduct by local public and private 
agents. The role of the European Monetary System (EMS), first, and the 
EMU, later, in imposing the necessary changes was  asserted in various 
forms, such as  the “vincolo esterno” or external empowerment (Carli, 
1993: 406; Dyson, Featherstone, 1999), the “tying one’s hands” or 
“scapegoat” mechanism (Giavazzi, Pagano, 1988; Begg, 2002), the “back 
against the wall” (Alesina et al, 2006) and “there is no alternative” (Bean, 
1998) theses.  As Featherstone (2001: 1) pointed out, this argument has 
been used differently within different institutional settings, as either a 
strategic lever for reform or a stimulus to shift norms and beliefs affecting 
policy. The former (latter) was mainly the case for higher- (lower-)inflation 
countries. Legitimization of reforms at the local level was thus largely 
devolved upon the EMU institutions, including the operations of markets.  
However, as McNamera’s (1998) put it, the argument and the option of 
the ‘vincolo esterno’ were mainly a fruit of a consensus among élites 
redefining the role of the state. Penetration among most sections of the 
population lagged or lacked at all. We can also add that the consensus 
was fragile in many cases, each of the various sections of the élites 
hoping to shift the burden of adjustment to others. The consensus and 
reliance on the virtues of markets and the common currency and the SGP, 
on the one side, deprived national governments’ policies of much content 
or reduced their effective range of action and, on the other, convinced the 
public opinion of the possibility that everything was about to be settled, 
automatically, simply as an effect of participating to the Union. Public 
opinion did not really put much emphasis on the need for structural 
reforms. The nature of the adjustment needed  - with the possible 
exception of reducing the public debt - and the possibility of being 
exposed to shocks and crises were not clear. A similar effect of reducing 
the expectations of adjustment at the national level derived from the 
consideration that much of the necessary convergence of the higher-
inflation countries had been obtained as an effect of complying with the 
  
Maastricht rules for admission. Admission was thus considered by many 
as the final act in the series of painful measures to be adopted by these 
countries. Further, comparisons with the state of Germany in the first 
years of the Union tended to confirm this orientation and induced to 
optimism.  
Even those who were conscious of the necessity of reforms and did not 
trust national governments or private agents for the will and ability to 
undertake them, somehow relied on Europe’s action. However, as said, 
the EMU and other existing common institutions were not empowered with 
most of the required actions. 
Bean (1998) presented a rather balanced view of economic and political 
considerations favouring or being an obstacle to structural reforms at a 
national level. His economic arguments in favour – notably the ‘there is no 
alternative’ (TINA) argument (or a variant of it), and in particular the 
incentive to render the local environment more attractive for business, the 
increase in decentralized labour bargaining - seem to prevail over those 
against (mainly, the incentive for reforms is lower in a monetary union 
from the point of view of time inconsistency; and absence of rules for debt 
consolidation lowers incentives). All in all, the arguments sustaining their 
political feasibility were less favourable to adoption of reforms. A decisive 
reason being of obstacle to reforms are the short-run costs that they 
would impose on a rather wide group of people. Their opposition could be 
easily overcome in a growing environment, but this is difficult to obtain at 
the Union level, as reforms are prevailingly an issue for a subset of 
countries and are not considered to be a common issue. 
In Italy the ‘ vincolo esterno” (or external empowerment) argument was 
rather diffuse. An independent external monetary authority could enhance 
separation of the Italy’s central bank from the government and its ‘whip’.  
Together with the passage to a common currency it could make markets 
and foreign competition to work and ensure efficiency: the external 
constraints would be capable of forcing politicians, businessmen and trade 
unions to a more efficient conduct in due time (Dyson and Featherstone, 
1999: chapters 10, 11).  
Begg (2002) presented a balanced view and in substance advocates 
participation of social partners to the process of reforms, to avoid 
disruptive results. Participation was seen as necessary, since ‘if guidelines 
are issued by ‘Brussels’ that call for unpopular or controversial reforms, 
they risk being seen as unacceptable (Chassard, 2001). A risk in this 
regard was that the EU could be used as a scapegoat. Indeed it might be 
argued that this could provide part of the motivation for Europeanisation to 
governments keen to push through unpopular measures such as agreeing 
to pension reforms at the European level in order to circumvent a lack of 
domestic support.’ (Begg, 2002: 14-15).  Another risk was that different 
levels of governance had roles that should be complementary, but in 
practice could be subject to competitive overlapping, originating confusion 
  
(the ‘too many cooks’ syndrome), rather than the ideal fusion of the kind 
suggested by Wessels (1997), which is necessary for the establishment of 
a single policy system. In particular, heterogeneity of employment and 
employment policy in the EMU called for the clarification of a model 
towards which change should be directed as well as of the agents that 
would push toward it at the various levels. In this sense too see Begg 
(2002). 
Recent reflections by Heinemann and Grigoriadis on the way to 
harmonize different agent’s expectations and conduct can be useful: ‘On 
the general level, the theoretical reasoning and the empirical jointly 
suggest that a theory of reform resistance is severely flawed if it is simply 
based on the view of reform-resistance driven by narrow self-interest. The 
micro-evidence, in particular, underlines the role of (procedural) fairness 
considerations. Voters need a minimum confidence into their democratic 
institutions in order to accept the uncertainties involved in far-reaching 
institutional change. Interestingly, trust in European institutions can to 
some extent be a substitute for trust in national institutions.’ (Heinemann, 
Grigoriadis, 2013: 38). Trust in Europe was in effect high and this could 
compensate for the lack of trust in national government in many EMU 
countries. However, Europe was not empowered with the exactly kind of 
policy instruments needed to reform labour markets, business structure 
and conduct, public administration. 
We must be clear about the reasons why the EMU would represent an 
external tie as well as the agents that would have been constrained by the 
Union’s institutions. These reasons can refer to: adoption of contractionary 
monetary and fiscal policies, the existence of a more fierce competition in 
product and labour markets, limits to public deficits and debts. In the next 
sub-section we deal with national policymakers’ attitudes towards reforms 
simply as a consequence of contractionary monetary and fiscal policies. 
The issue of signals and incentives to both policymakers and private 
agents deriving from strict monetary and fiscal discipline and market 
constraints before and after admission to the Union is the object of 
sections 4 and 5.  
 
3.2. Policymakers’ attitudes towards reforms with contractionary 
monetary and fiscal policies.  
 
Adoption of a regime of fiscal and monetary discipline would generate 
mixed effects according to Coricelli, Cukierman, Dalmazzo (2006), 
Acemoglu, Johnson, Querubin, Robinson (2008). A regime of discipline 
was enforced both in the way to the common currency (at least in the 
higher-inflation countries, for which fulfilling the Maastricht requirements 
was more problematic) and afterwards (as the ECB had to establish a 
reputation and the SGP was in effect).  
  
Acemoglu et al present a model where reforms of the kind advocated in 
other contexts by the Washington Consensus (basically, restrictive fiscal 
and monetary policy, reforms that are supposed to be efficiency-
enhancing such as market liberalization, privatization, etc.) can be 
detrimental. In fact, in their opinion such reforms induce politicians to 
adopt other instruments for furthering their redistributive action, patronage, 
etc., thus originating a kind of ‘seesaw’ effect.  
In Coricelli, Cukierman, Dalmazzo (2006) and Dalmazzo (2014) a 
stricter monetary policy has positive effects on both inflation and 
unemployment, as it imposes a discipline on trade unions. However, 
according to Dalmazzo, ‘commitment to price-stability may allow 
governments to persist in “bad” fiscal policies and tolerance for low 
competition’, as governments can trade part of the social gains deriving 
from it for distortionary taxation, redistribution, patronage and the like  
(Dalmazzo, 2014: 4). Thus a more conservative central bank tends to 
raise the tax rate, thus questioning the desirability of this type of monetary 
authority claimed by Coricelli, Cukierman, Dalmazzo (2006).  In addition, 
monetary discipline reduces market deregulation. This result casts doubts 
on the validity of the argument in favour of resorting to an external 
constraint under the form of a conservative central bank in order to reform 
countries characterized by lax fiscal policies and scarcely competitive 
goods markets.  However, these implications can be accepted only after 
careful analysis. Not only because models such as in Dalmazzo (2014) 
are used admitting no trade-off between inflation and unemployment (at 
least in the short run). In addition, they do not consider that, 
notwithstanding the similarities in the two periods in so far as adoption of 
stricter monetary and fiscal discipline is concerned, as said, these have 
other features, which can justify apparently different behavior of public and 
private agents in the transition period and after membership had been 
gained. Thus, the conclusion reached by using the models under 
consideration y do not fully take into account the incentives of 
policymakers and private agents before and after the admission to the 
EMU. In the next two sections we discuss precisely these issues. 
 
 
4. INCENTIVES AND SIGNALS  
 
4.1. Incentives during the transition to the EMU and after  
 
The ‘transition’ to the EMU of the various countries, in particular of the 
peripheral countries that were not part of the EMS, implied a number of 
effects on incentives. Some of them pertain to adoption of a stricter 
regime of monetary and fiscal discipline. As said before, this has featured 
not only the proper transition period before admission to EMU, but also 
  
that of the following full participation to the Union. However, each of these 
two periods has specific features, as we explain now.  
The former also implied some kind of mitigation in the effects of 
contractionary policies deriving from both reduced real interest rates, due 
to disappearance of the country currency risk, and the prospect of a future 
‘prize’ attached to admission to the Union (for this effect see also IMF, 
2004: 114) . This prospect of a prize certainly affected the conduct of 
some agents, notably the government, big firms and trade unions (at least 
those with some degree of centralization), which were conscious of the 
stricter relation between their conduct and the possibility to earn the prize 
(on this see Acocella, Di Bartolomeo, Tirelli, 2009). More questionable is 
the likelihood of a similar conduct by small- and medium-size enterprises, 
due to their likely free-rider attitude. 
By contrast, after admission to the EMU, there was no apparent 
prospect of a future prize tied to restructuring, eliminating inefficiencies 
and unsustainable budgets, as the  effects of contractionary policies at the 
EMU level were mitigated by some kind of soft budget constraint . 
Strictness of the regime in existence after admission to EMU can in fact 
be – and has been - questioned, as credit availability increased in 
peripheral countries. This is really an effect that began to loom - along 
with reduction in real interest rates in these countries – during the 
transition period. However, it could take momentum only after some time 
and especially after the signal of formal admission of peripheral countries 
to the EMU, which was commonly perceived as crossing the finishing line. 
Capital inflows to higher-inflation countries from abroad, mainly from 
Germany, raised credit availability especially to private agents and created 
a bubble. Absence of a (further) prize related to EMU participation coupled 
with a soft-budget constraint could thus have reduced incentives to enact 
structural reforms in higher-inflation countries. In terms of Dalmazzo’s 
model, this would correspond to an exogenous rise in the weight put on 
redistribution of rents; differently, however, from his model, this rise in the 
weight would derive from having reached the target of being admitted to 
the Union. 
Then, on the top of a common issue, i.e. contractionary monetary and 
fiscal policies at the EMU level, the two periods could imply different 
outcomes for both public and private agents. What certainly makes the 
two periods differ, in fact, is that an issue of reduced incentives for a 
‘correct’ conduct of public and private agents was more likely to arise after 
the prize of the admission to the Union had been cashed and no future 
prize was in sight. In addition, also the influence of the changed budget 
constraint deriving from low interest rates and credit availability induced 
optimistic or ‘distorted’ beliefs and expectations of future prospects. We 
deal with the implications deriving from the changed budget constraint in 
the next sub-section.  
 
  
4.2. The budget constraint and incentives. 
 
According to Baskaran, Hessami (2013), the EMU did not imply a harder 
budget constraint of the kind advocated by the supporters of the argument 
of the external tie induced by fixed exchange rates. Instead, in accordance 
with literature since Wildasin (1997), they find empirical support for the 
idea that the EMU itself created a soft budget constraint.  In their opinion, 
this would derive from the failure of the European Council to sanction 
France and Germany in 2003, which - in addition to Portugal - had 
violated the SGP. According to them, this failure reduced public and 
private agents’ incentives for reforms in other countries. This explanation 
might be insufficient, as the effect would have acted only after that date.  
The additional issue arising from it is why the soft budget constraint, first 
inaugurated by France and Germany, operated in some countries only 
(those with a higher inflation), not in others in the following years. Nor it 
would explain why the violation of the SGP induced a ‘virtuous’ conduct by 
at least Germany, but not in Portugal. 
A different explanation would be that the signal of a soft budget 
constraint could have come from the way the EMU was conceived and 
worked since its first years of existence, as the bubbles generated in the 
peripheral countries by capital inflows gave the impression that everything 
was right there (FV, 2013). FV basically suggest two reasons for the 
existence of a soft budget constraint:  i. public decision process can be 
assimilated to a war of attrition (Alesina, Drazen, 1991); this implies that 
free capital movements and capital inflows, like aid, have the effect of 
delaying reforms (Casella, Eichengreen, 1996) by relaxing budget 
constraints; ii. Independently of that, it is difficult for ‘principals’  to extract 
good signals with bubbles and booms. Easy borrowing leads to low long 
run growth, as it multiplies future engagements for wrong or low-
productive investment, thus wasting resources. Among a number of 
implications, it causes: a variant of the Dutch disease leading to 
misallocation of resources away from the tradable sector; a deterioration 
in policy and institutions, which are induced to resorting to debt and 
postponing reforms.   
This explanation – which would also clarify why the decision of the 
European Council not to sanction France and Germany in 2003 would 
have acted only on higher-inflation countries in the following years - 
emphasises the interaction between bubbles and policies. Bubbles 
induced public and private agents to choose ‘soft’ policies, i.e. they gave 
the politicians an incentive to raise deficits and private agents to increase 
their leverage. Lane, McQuade (2013) in fact finds a positive correlation 
between net capital inflows and domestic credit. This made it easier for 
the government and the private sector to borrow, thus reducing their 
incentive to adopt ‘sound’ policies. Reduced interest rates in the period 
before entry in the EMU didn’t have similar effects, especially on 
  
politicians, as their conduct should have been ‘virtuous’, pending 
admission. In addition, capital outflows from ‘core’ countries had not yet 
materialized.  
By contrast, Germany, as a country with very low inflation rates, 
exported capital abroad and suffered from a kind of hard budget 
constraint, also as an effect of the policies following unification with 
Eastern lander.  
Looking at figures, government debt (as a percentage of GDP) lowered 
for some higher-inflation countries (Portugal, Greece, up to 1999-2000) 
and then increased; for other countries, the reduction lasted (but at a 
slower rate than in the period up to 2000) until 2004 (in Italy) or 2007 
(Spain, Ireland).  
More uniform in all higher-inflation countries was the growth 
performance, which was strong or very strong until 1999 or 2000, slightly 
lower since, up to the financial crisis begun in 2007-8 , with the exception 
of the service sector and constructions. By contrast, growth was rather 
high in Germany until 2001, which reflected also on a current account 
deficit until 2002-2003 , but drastically dropped afterwards. Thus, with the 
only exception of Greece, there was no boom in higher-inflation countries 
after their inception into the EMU, as claimed by FV and EEAG (2011). 
However, the soaring asset prices certainly relaxed credit and budget 
constraints in high inflation countries, even if this was not to such an 
extent as to propel a boom, at least in comparison with the pre-EMU 
period, with the exception of Greece (Eurostat, no date). Some constraints 
deriving from the new institutions, such as a monetary policy that was 
contractionary at least until mid-2001, might have braked a possible 
boom. More than total GDP growth, growth in specific sectors, such as 
construction and the financial sector, is important, as an indicator of 
growing asset prices and wealth. This was of the utmost importance for 
growth of consumption  and is likely to have generated some 
misperception or a false assessment of fundamentals. This was 
‘corrected’ only when the crisis erupted in Greece in the second half of 
2009.  
All in all, however, bubbles certainly existed that could have supported 
an otherwise very low growth in the whole economy, as an effect of a 
rather contractionary monetary policy and limits to budget deficits 
introduced by the SGP. This would suggest an explanation of the 
evolution of policies and the performance of higher-inflation countries 
based on the absence of proper signal for the need of a change. We deal 
with this in the next sub-section. 
 
4.3. Why wrong signals can arise?  
 
After accession, the important signals of the balance of payments and 
the exchange rate were lost. Relaxation of the external constraint due to 
  
free capital movements implied not only a rather high growth rate in that 
course of action, but also the loss of proper signals, at least for the 
government, of the reduction in the country’s competitiveness, which in 
due time could have a negative influence on growth and the very 
possibility of continuing to extract rents. The balance of payments, the 
current account as well as some indicators of competitiveness could still 
be calculated, but the idea that any current account deficit could be 
balanced by capital inflows, with no negative impact on the (nominal) 
exchange rate, together with the moderately high rate of growth, were 
reassuring for policymakers. For private agents, the contemporaneous fall 
or reduction in aggregate demand abroad and at least partial substitution 
of the domestic to the foreign market (made possible to some extent by 
the looming bubble) also meant that signals of a loss of competitiveness 
were noisy. Finally, reliance on temporary jobs as well as on relocation 
abroad of some industrial production lines implied that many firms could 
cope with reduced demand abroad, the impossibility to resort to nominal 
currency devaluation, inefficiencies and rents, without suffering a 
substantive loss in their competiveness, at least in the short- or medium-
run.  
More generally, the ability of private and public agents to perceive the 
right market signals can be debated. From this point of view we spot two 
kinds of issues: a. Can markets send the right signals to policymakers and 
agents and, in the affirmative, under what conditions? Symmetrically, what 
are the difficulties of signal extraction in market economies? b. Do 
markets send correct signals in a monetary union and, more specifically, 
in the case of EMU?  
a. Why difficulties of signal extraction in a market economy?  
There are a number of reasons supporting existence of difficulties in 
signal extraction from market trends. Some refer to markets and political 
institutions in general. First, signals coming out of market trends can be 
noisy, depending on existence of multiple equilibria. In addition, even if 
there were a unique equilibrium, mention should be made of short-
sightedness of people and policymakers and the role of political 
institutions, populism and national specificities. Short-sightedness is 
particularly acute in financial markets and certainly acted in the EMU (De 
Grauwe, Yi, 2013). Moreover, the procedure followed by public and 
private agents for extracting the right signals is imperfect, as they do not 
know the right model.  In the end there might be a few people able to 
apply correct methods of signal extraction. Most private agents perceive 
signals and adapt their expectations mainly on the basis of the specific 
market where they operate. Their ability to perceive imbalances looming 
elsewhere and ultimately having a reflection on the market where they 
operate is often scanty. Even when this is not so and some agents look at 
the generality of markets, they may ignore signals from other related 
markets, being specifically interested in the evolution of their own market, 
  
as either this is more pressing or interrelations as between markets are 
difficult to assess. 
This has induced some authors to suggest alternative ways to cope with 
excessive capital inflows and current account imbalances. The former can 
be regulated by proper direct control or taxes. In the case of a current 
account imbalance due to competitiveness, wages should be lowered or 
raised according to the nature of the imbalance, also by means of income 
policies. Imbalances in the current account not due to competitiveness 
should be faced by boosting or contracting aggregate demand. There are 
however two opposing considerations especially addressed to use of 
direct policy instruments: one is theoretical; the other is practical. The 
former says that, in the words of EEAG, ‘we find such proposals naive and 
dangerous, because, by attempting to mimic through controls the outcome 
of market discipline, they are bound to confuse symptoms with causes 
and direct the attention to policy tools that are entirely inappropriate as 
remedies against long-term structural deficiencies of market economies’ 
(EEAG, 2011: 82). The latter has to do with the Union’s institutional 
architecture, which rules out capital controls and emphasizes market self-
adjustment, practically banning other forms of common policy intervention. 
Both these considerations can be debated. As to the former, it is true 
that causes rather than pure symptoms should be removed. However, this 
requires time, as the causes are difficult to tackle, the more so when this 
must be done at the country level, in the absence of suitable common 
labour and industrial policies. Arguments against the position expressed 
by the EEAG also derive from the critique of the theoretical foundations of 
EMU institutions and the need to reform them (see Acocella, 2014b). 
b. Apart from these considerations, do markets in a monetary union 
send the right signals to policymakers and agents? And can they operate 
in such a way as to overcome them? The answer to both questions could 
be conditionally in the affirmative. As for current account imbalances, 
correctness and effectiveness of signals depend not only on the size of 
imbalances and imperfections in the product markets, but also on the 
degree of wage flexibility and labour mobility, as labour markets are often 
characterized by more rigidities and tend to react to the signals with a 
longer delay. As to capital markets, they can send signals, if policymakers 
correctly interpret them. However, they are plagued by issues such as 
beauty contests and, as seen, can overreact and create bubbles. Issues 
can then be complicated by  the different speed of adjustment as between 
the different markets.  
Is a monetary union conceivable without free capital mobility? Possibly 
not, but in this case common policies - financial regulation, in particular of 
banks, industrial and labour policy, appropriate monetary and fiscal 
policies – should be added to avoid imbalances in different areas. The 
very way of operating of a monetary union with structural differences 
among the different countries and free capital movements would expose 
  
(and has exposed) it to a risk of break up, in the absence of other 
common policies, low labour mobility, no fiscal union, no lender of last 
resort for governments (Krugman 2013). 
 
 
5. INCENTIVES, MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION OF 
POLICYMAKERS 
 
5.1. Signals and moral hazard 
 
Absence of a proper system of incentives does not imply moral hazard, 
as this requires existence of asymmetric information and a conduct by 
agents that is detrimental to the principal. Moral hazard arises because 
the agent does not take the full consequences and responsibilities of its 
actions, thus acting less carefully than it otherwise would, leaving the 
principal to bear some negative consequence of the actions. Absence of 
incentives or disincentives simply implies that some wrong signal let him 
think that the environment where he acts has lasting negative or positive 
features, which induces the agent to think that his current conduct is 
profitable.  
Let us refer to the different markets where moral hazard might have 
played a role. The main markets are those for goods, labour and financial 
assets. There is no immediate way of devising some kind of asymmetric 
information relevant for our issues in the first two markets. However, the 
change in institutions can act on the incentives usually existing in those 
markets. Take the case  of the Hartz reforms in Germany: the situation of 
hard budget constraint existing there for the reasons already indicated, 
induced the government to enact a series of reforms related to the labour 
market that had a positive impact on the workers’ incentive to accept a job 
and possibly also to change the terms of wage bargaining. An even more 
manifest kind of moral hazard could have interested financial operators 
and the government, but, most likely, after insurgence of the crisis, when 
some kind of guarantees were expected in certain contingencies.  
 
5.2. Bubbles, entry of politicians as a pre-selection process and adverse 
selection.  
 
Bubbles can act not only on incentives of agents in general, but also on 
adverse selection of politicians and other agents.  
Taking issues of partisanship aside, when we introduce asymmetric 
information, separating bad from good politicians is very difficult, as the 
program of future policy declared by each candidate before the election is 
always incomplete and may not correspond to his real intentions and 
future choices. This is especially important after admission to the EMU. In 
fact, after 1999 the process of restructuring the economy of ‘peripheral’ 
countries had still to be completed, but the prospects of continuing 
  
relatively high growth rates and benefits from participation to the EMU was 
so diffuse. Then people were more inclined to opt for candidates – even 
the less able and/or having a special interest in taking office - promising 
some relaxation of the restrictive policy experienced until then (Le Borgne, 
Lockwood, 2012) and some promises of soft budget constraint to the 
‘core’ constituency were appealing while appearing credible, which can 
positively influence the probability of a poll success or political survival of 
a ruling government (Robinson, Torvik 2009). 
Let us suppose, as an example, that all the assumptions for the validity 
of the median voter model hold. Each constituent will vote according to his 
preferences, under the constraint of his current and prospective budget. 
Let us assume also that current incomes have all been reduced by 
contractionary policies. Two parties offer different prospects for their 
policies: one, A, promises to continue its present contractionary policy; the 
other, B, promises to reduce taxes just as a way to prevail in the entry 
stage of the political process. The latter will be chosen, as the alternative 
prospect is no longer tied to the promise of a benefit like that of entering 
the EMU, an event thought to be fruitful of future gains. Whether this 
theoretical conclusion corresponds to stylized facts in ‘peripheral’ 
countries is a matter of inquiry, since not only the median voter model has 
a number of limitations, but also different specific circumstances can 
operate in each country that make non-populist politicians to prevail.  
 
 
6.CONCLUSIONS 
 
Markets show well known difficulties in delivering the right signals of 
looming imbalances, may underreact or overreact to them and cannot 
properly correct them. Pure monetary unions, i.e. unions with no other 
common institutions than the common currency and markets, add no 
significant system of signaling and instrument for re-adjustment at least in 
the short or medium run and can even cause further imbalances, as free 
mobility of capital can create bubbles which mask them. The more so if 
the asymmetries producing such imbalances have a structural nature, as, 
in this case, some markets, such as labour markets, may not work in an 
appropriate way. In particular, the high capital mobility is not matched by a 
high international labour mobility and an essential condition for a currency 
union to work is thus not fulfilled. In this situation moral hazard and 
adverse selection are easy to arise, making correction of imbalances more 
difficult. 
The system should then be helped to deliver proper signals and to 
correct them. The OCA theory must be made to work and appropriate 
non-market institutions, mainly at the union level, should be created. In 
particular, a common financial regulation, fiscal, industrial and labour 
  
policies should be introduced, while devising consistent institutions at the 
country level. 
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